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IS IT WORTH SAVING? THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESPONSIBLE
CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE BEYOND PARK

ELIZABETH LAUTENBACH, J.D. CANDIDATE, 2015

I. INTRODUCTION
Health care fraud is a huge money maker for the United States government. In 2010, the
government recaptured $4 billion dollars in settlement monies. 1

In 2011, the government

continued the trend and received an increase of about thirty percent more in settlements,
amassing $6.4 billion dollars from the health care arena alone. 2

This current movement shows

no sign of stopping or slowing down anytime soon. The government collects these tremendous
settlement amounts from actors in the pharmaceutical and medical device industry who are
presently in a state of confusion. There is a current lack of idea and scope of prosecution, so
much so that executives do not have a clear understanding of what actions can get them in
trouble and the enormous criminal and civil penalties that strike both executives and companies
when they are the center of a prosecution.

The basis for the Food and Drug Administration

(hereinafter “FDA”) and the Department of Justice (hereinafter “DOJ”) to stand is problematic:
investigations and prosecution are grounded in two out of date cases and different administrative
approaches.
After two significant United States Supreme Court cases and the revival of the use of the
responsible corporate office doctrine through governmental prosecutions, many within the legal

1

2011 Year-End Health Care Compliance Update, GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUT CHER LLP (Feb. 6, 2012)

http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2011YearEndHealthCareCo mplianceUpdate.pdf.
2

Id.
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realm are fearful of the use of the doctrine because of the absence of mens rea or knowledge to
convict.3

Also, many corporate executives fear the punishments that accompany settlements in

this area including imprisonment and

exclusion from any federal healthcare program. 4

Additionally, the DOJ can move forward with prosecution in any case without availing
themselves of the FDA’s specialized knowledge of investigations and violations. 5

For these

reasons, many industry officers and legal scholars are skeptical of the actual legality of the
doctrine and advocate for the doctrine to be challenged.6
Although the responsible corporate officer doctrine 7 was borne from good intentions (a
public welfare statute with strict liability to protect consumers of products the FDA serves), the
government has misused and will continue to misuse a doctrine that stands on shaky grounds
unless the courts, government actors, and industry executives can work together to collaborate on
a solution. Part II reviews the history of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (hereinafter
“FD&C Act”) as it relates to the responsible corporate officer doctrine and examines the two
cases that form the basis of the doctrine: US v. Dotterweich and US v. Park. Part III introduces
the government actors and actions that revived the responsible corporate officer doctrine. Part
3

Amiad Kushner, Applying the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine Outside the Public Welfare Context , 93

N.Y.U. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 681, 681 (2003).
4

Abraham Gitterman, Executives Should Think Twice Before Accepting Pleas ‘Relating to Fraud’: The Expansion

of Exclusion Under the Park Doctrine, 25 No. 6 HTHLAW 1, 2-3 (2013).
5

Jennifer Bragg, et al., Onus of Responsibility: The Changing Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine , 65 FOOD &

DRUG L.J. 525, 534 (2010).
6

Kushner, supra note 3, at 683.

7

The term “responsible corporate officer doctrine” is also called the “Park Doctrine” and can be used

interchangeably. For purposes of this writing, except when citing an official writing, the doctrine will be referred to
as the “responsible corporate officer doctrine.”
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IV scrutinizes notable recent settlements identifies the lack of trials in this area. Part V sets out
specific recommendations to answer these questions including: (1) judicial review, (2) narrowing
the doctrine through legislative action, (3) the use of tandem prosecution to include both the
FDA and DOJ in future prosecutions, and (4) industry action to safeguard corporations from
possible prosecution.

II. THE PARK PROBLEM
A. FD&C Act Generally
In 1938, Congress granted enforcement authority to regulate several product areas
including food, drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices to the FDA through the FD&C Act. 8 The
FD&C Act prohibits many actions including adulteration and misbranding of a regulated product
or the introduction of an adulterated or misbranded product into interstate commerce. 9 A person
commits a misdemeanor under the FD&C Act when they “take or cause a prohibited action.”10
Furthermore, a person who commits the aforementioned violation “with the intent to defraud or
mislead” or a person who has already been convicted of an FD&C Act violation commits a
felony.11

The Secretary of the FDA can debar a person convicted of the FD&C Act from

participation in drug companies12 while the Office of Inspector General (hereinafter “OIG”) can

8

21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).

9

21 U.S.C. § 331(a)-(b).

10

21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2).

11

Id.

12

21 U.S.C. § 335(a)(2).
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exclude a person convicted of the FD&C Act from participation in federal healthcare programs. 13
The FD&C Act is a public welfare statute which imposes strict liability on an act, regardless of
the actor’s intent knowledge, or personal participation. 14 The responsible corporate officer
doctrine emerged from interpretation of the FD&C Act through the Supreme Court several years
later.
B. Responsible Corporate Officer Cases and Comparison/Synthesis
The Supreme Court faced novel, interpretive questions posed by the two primary cases
which formed the basis of the responsible corporate officer doctrine.

An individual can be

personally liable under the FD&C Act if there is proof of inaction when the law demands
attention or where carelessness is enough to impute guilt. 15

If you are a corporate executive

doing business in an area regulated by the FDA, the Supreme Court through Park and
Dotterweich imposes an affirmative obligation on the part of those individuals at a corporation
that have the authority and power to determine whether there was a violation of the FD&C Act to
make changes, take action, and remedy the situation. 16
i. US v. Dotterweich (1943)
Joseph Dotterweich served the President and General Manager of the Buffalo Pharmacal
Company, Inc.17

Buffalo Pharmacal purchased pharmaceutical drugs which they subsequently

13

See discussion of debarment and exclusion, infra p. 19.

14

See discussion of the FD&C Act as a public welfare statute, infra pp. 12-13.

15

United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1943).

16

United States v. Park , 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975).

17

Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278.
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repackaged in a new container and resold to other buyers. 18 The government alleged that Buffalo
Pharmacal and Dotterweich violated the FD&C Act by shipping adulterated or misbranded drug
in interstate commerce.19

After a trial, both the corporation and Dotterweich were convicted in

federal court.20 Afterwards, both convictions were reversed on appeal. 21
Upon granting certiorari, the novel question of whether the language of “person” in the
FD&C Act can convict an individual working on behalf of a corporation faced the Supreme
Court.22

Writing for the majority,23 Justice Frankfurter answered in the affirmative and reversed

the finding of the Second Circuit. 24

He stated that the FD&C Act is “a now familiar type” of

statute which “dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct – awareness of
some wrongdoing.”25 Justice Frankfurter reasoned that the defendant’s rights should be balanced
against the rights of the public who are defenseless against companies who release an adulterated
or misbranded product on the market because the FD&C Act is a public health statute. 26 The
Supreme Court articulated the position that a defendant who has a “responsible share in the

18

Id.

19

21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1938).

20

Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Dotterweich was a close 5-4 decision with a scathing dissent written by Justice Murphy. See discussion of the

aforementioned dissent, infra pp. 11-12.
24

Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278.

25

Id. at 280-81.

26

Id. at 278.
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furtherance of” the transgression which the executive was charged will fail the balancing test and
should be found guilty at trial.27
From a policy standpoint, the executive in charge should be accountable for
transgressions arising from violations occurring during their leadership whether or not they
personally acted in the violation.

The Supreme Court did not specify a category or set of

corporate executives who would fit this new standard and left that decision to all involved in the
trial process, specifically “the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and
the ultimate judgment of juries.”28
The Dotterweich case gave life to the groundwork of the responsible corporate officer
doctrine which stands for the principle that a public welfare statute like the federal FD&C Act
“puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible
relation to a public danger” for the sake of the public at large. 29

In other words, absence of

knowledge is sufficient for conviction under a public welfare statute.30 They do not have to have
cooperated, engaged in, or know of the violation to share in a portion of the blame or liability for
any committed offenses.31
ii. US v. Park (1975)

27

Id. at 284.

28

Id. at 285.

29
30

Id. at 281.
Andrew Ellis, “The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: Sharpening a Blunt Health Care Fraud

Enforcement Tool”, 9 N.Y.U J. L. & BUS., 977, 986 (2013).
31

Amy Sepinwall, “Responsible Shares and Shared Responsibility: In Defense of Responsible Corporate Officer

Liability”, 25 No. 6 COLUM. BUS. L. REV., 371, 378 (2014).
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The second case that lays the foundation of the responsible corporate officer doctrine
came before the Supreme Court in 1975 in US v. Park.32 Similar to Dotterweich, the government
argued that there were violations pursuant to the FD&C Act at Acme Supermarkets where Park
served as President.33 However, the breadth of the allegations was much different. While
Dotterweich did not contaminate the drugs that came into his company’s care, prosecutors
argued that Park permitted his facilities to become infested with animals and contaminated the
stored food.34 Additionally, prosecutors alleged that Park knew of the unsanitary conditions in
his Baltimore warehouses but did not do enough to cure the defects. 35 In particular, Park was
aware of the defects as evidenced by an FDA warning letter as well as two FDA inspections of
the warehouse in question.36 Instead of personally acting to cure the defects, Park assigned that
responsibility to the manager of the specific warehouse. 37

Park was convicted at trial in the

United States District Court for the District of Maryland 38 and that convicted was subsequently
reversed by the Fourth Circuit in 1973. 39
In 1975, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Fourth Circuit primarily with the
“responsible share” language from Dotterweich.40

32

Park, 421 U.S. at 658.

33

Id. at 658.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 661-62.

37

Id. at 658.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id.

7
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majority posited that the government does not need to prove that the defendant had any
knowledge of the underlying offense as long as the person being charged is a corporate executive
that had the “responsibility and authority” to take action on behalf of the company and “failed to
do so”.41

After Park, the responsible corporate officer doctrine stands for the principle that an

executive can be punished if they have the power to stop the offense from happening in the first
place and they choose not to.42 This principle stems from the corporate executive’s positive duty
to run a corporation which puts the health and wellness of the public before profit. 43
Additionally, an ensuing conviction of the FD&C Act after any previous conviction of the
FD&C Act is deemed a felony regardless of the factual circumstances. 44
Further, Justice Burger articulates that an executive can dispute liability by raising an
impossibility defense. The corporate officer who can show that they were “powerless to prevent
or correct the violation”45 can mitigate their position. Does an impossibility defense like the one
explained in Park change the dynamics in the culpability requirements because it is available?
Can the responsible corporate officer doctrine rightfully be used as a strict liability standard if
the executive can raise a defense? These are questions a corporate executive can raise if one
chooses to refuse a settlement offer and proceeds to a trial. 46

41

Id. at 673.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2).

45

Id. at 673.

46

See discussion of settlements, infra pp. 19-30.
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iii. Synthesis of Similarities and Differences between Dotterweich and
Park
FIGURE 1: Dotterweich/Park Analysis
Individual
Involved
US v.
Joseph
Dotterweich Dotterweich,
(1943)
President
and General
Manager of
Buffalo
Pharmacal
Company

US v. Park
(1975)

John Park,
President
and CEO of
Acme
Supermarket

FDA
Regulated
Product
Pharmaceutical
Drugs

Food

FD&C Act
Violations

Money

Penalties

Knowledge
Aspects

3
Misdemeananor counts
of shipping
adulterated
and
misbranded
drugs into
interstate
commerce
5
Misdemeananor counts
of causing
adulteration
of food

N/A

Conviction
under the
FD&C
Act

No
Knowledge

N/A

Conviction
under the
FD&C
Act

Knowledge:
repeated
warning
letters, a
failed FDA
inspection

There are two distinct similarities between the two aforementioned cases. The first
similarity is their position. Dotterweich and Park were both presidents of their respective
companies.

While neither case sets out a list of specific persons who hold specific positions

within a company that will be subject to prosecution through a FD&C Act investigation, these
Supreme Court cases makes it certain that the executive at the top will be ultimately responsible
for any violations during their watch whether they are involved in the violations in question or
9
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not. The second similarity between Dotterweich and Park is that both the companies and the
presidents were prosecuted under the FD&C Act. The FD&C Act is a public welfare statute that
enjoys the benefits of strict liability.47
There is one substantial difference between the Dotterweich and Park cases. While the
Dotterweich case does not go into many specifics in regards to its facts, it is clear that
Dotterweich did not know the actions of what happened to the drugs that were the center of this
violation.

In fact, the dissent points out that the government did not introduce proof that

Dotterweich had any involvement or participation in the violation.48

30 years later in Park, a

much different scenario was presented. Over the course of three years, Park received several
warning letters and a failed inspection notice from the FDA concerning contamination of a
specific food storage warehouse.49

Armed with this knowledge, it was easy for Park to rectify

the problem because he was aware of the conduct. 50 However, Park did not do enough within
his power to remedy the problem.51 Instead, Park was flippant when tasked to make changes that
could improve the safety of those that consume his products.

52

Therefore, Park can be

distinguished from Dotterweich because Park is less problematic from a mens rea standpoint.
Park knew of the offenses and did not stop them; he only delegated the responsibility to others.
C. Implications/Departure from Criminal Law Concepts

47

See discussion of criminal law tenets, infra pp. 10-13.

48

Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 286.

49

Park, 421 U.S. at 658.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.
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i. Mens Rea Culpability Requirement
In criminal cases, an accused must have acted with the requisite mens rea to be convicted
of the alleged crime.53

The responsible corporate officer doctrine expanded the range of liability

because the government does not need to prove knowledge or intent of the crime for executives
to be culpable of FD&C Act violations as well as responsible corporate officer doctrine
violations.54

Under the tents of criminal law, a defendant’s conduct must rise to the level of

intent of mens rea in order to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause. 55

Since

corporate officers without knowledge of the violation can and are found criminally accountable
due solely to their position of authority within the corporation, transgression pursued under the
responsible corporate office doctrine do not meet the culpability specifications the Supreme
Court articulated in Gypsum. Accordingly, those that were not engaged in the crime are charged
and suffer severe consequences, extending the scope of liability past what criminal law tenets
intended.56
These specific concerns of the responsible corporate officer doctrine travel back to 1943
when the dissent in Dotterweich took issue with the lack of evidence of knowledge or
participation in the federal FD&C Act violation of Mr. Dotterweich’s conviction. 57

The dissent

objects to the majority action of inserting an individual theory of liability into a statute that was

53

Ariel Glasner, Are Misdemeanor Prosecutions Under the Park Doctrine an Effective Mechanism for Deterring

Violations of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act? FDLI POLICY FORUM, 1, 3 (2011).
54

Id.

55

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978).

56

Sepinwall, supra note 31, at 379.

57

Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 286.
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not included in the final legislation. 58

The dissent also takes offense to the extent of the scope

that this ruling would have moving forward. 59 For example, Justice Murphy stated that a person
should not be found guilty of a crime without an “evil intention or consciousness of wrongdoing”
and public policy reasons should not run around basic tenets of criminal law. 60

A court today

could take this reasoning and use it to limit the responsible corporate officer doctrine for future
investigations and prosecutions.
ii. Strict Liability
Additionally, the Supreme Court could limit the responsible corporate officer doctrine
because strict liability under public welfare offenses is not applicable today. The theory of strict
liability derives from the notion that it is the job of the executive to make sure their products are
safe for the public when corporations are making a substantial amount of money from the
products.61 The majority in Dotterweich posited that public welfare statutes like the FD&C Act
“dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct – awareness of some
wrongdoing…”62

The Supreme Court has upheld public welfare offenses in a narrow set of

cases where penalties are “relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an
offender’s reputation.”63

Nevertheless, using the public welfare offenses doctrine to offenses

58

Id. at 290.

59

Id. at 286.

60

Id.

61

See Id. at 282-83 (“If the 1938 Act were construed as it was below, the penalties of the law could be imposed only

in the rare case where the corporation is merely an individual's alter ego. Corporations carrying on an illicit trade
would be subject only to…a ‘license fee’ for the conduct of an illegitimate business.”).
62

Id. at 281.

63

Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
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under the responsible corporate officer doctrine today is short-sighted because it frustrates the
criminal law tenets of knowledge and participation in the underlying offense.64 Additionally,
prosecutors are able to wield this power over defendants which could be a reason for the large
number of settlements in the pharmaceutical and medical device area.
Responsible corporate officer doctrine convictions do not fall within the category of
“relatively small” or “does no grave damage to an offender’s reputation.”65

Not only do these

convictions fall outside those categories, they are far from it. 66 Commentators have questioned
whether it is appropriate to continue prosecution under the responsible corporate office doctrine
when the public welfare offense exception does not squarely fit and this doctrine could violate
due process rights.67

By prosecuting solely because of position within an organization and not

prosecuting the ones who committed the violations, the responsible corporate officer doctrine
establishes a new set of individuals that can be implicated 68 and is in contrast to corporate law
principles where personally acting in the underlying offense is necessary for individual
liability.69

III. THE ROLE OF THE FDA/CONSEQUENCES FOR PROSECUTION

64

Kushner, supra note 3, at 682-83.

65

Glasner, supra note 53.

66

Id.

67

Bragg, et al., supra note 5, at 525.

68

Ellis, supra note 30, at 981.

69

Kushner, supra note 3, at 684-85.
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Penalties for violations of various aspects of the FD&C Act had previously been applied
to individuals solely because of their corporate positions through the responsible corporate
officer doctrine.

The responsible corporate officer doctrine, after its creation, fell into disfavor

when the FDA did not want to take an active role in investigating what would be cases classified
as misdemeanors.70

The responsible corporate officer doctrine, through the FD&C Act imposes

an affirmative obligation to determine whether there were violations of law happening within the
organization, take action, and remedy the situation. 71
A. From Bridging the Gap to Grassley
Reliance and prosecutions under the responsible corporate officer doctrine waned when
the doctrine fell into disfavor after 1960s-early 1970’s and was not used in the health
care/pharmaceutical and medical device realm. 72

Because of this lack of development, industry

executives were not worried about being the center of a prosecution. In 2010, the Government
Accountability Office, through Senator Charles E. Grassley the ranking member of the United
States Senate’s Committee on Finance, began to criticize the FDA for not taking a more active
role in criminal prosecutions of those who commit violations under the FDA’s watch when it is
the responsibility of the FDA to regulate prescription and over-the-counter drugs.73 They also
highlighted the growing sentiment that government agencies should being to act more

70

Gitterman, supra note 4, at 4.

71

Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74.

72

Ellis, supra note 30, at 989.

73

U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-10-221, Food and Drug Administration: Improved Monitoring and

Development of Performance Measures Needed to Strengthen Oversight of Criminal and Misconduct Investigations
10, at 1 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10221.pdf.
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aggressively with an increase in investigations. 74

Particularly, the GAO suggested that the

Office of Criminal Investigations (hereinafter “OCI”) play a more critical role in investigations. 75
However, despite these sentiments, nowhere in the report did the GAO instruct the FDA to
revive such a powerful tool as the responsible corporate officer doctrine.
B. Tide Turns: Commissioner Hamburg’s Signal to Industry
In response to Senator Grassley and the Committee of Finance’s sentiment, Margaret
Hamburg,

the Commissioner of the FDA, recommended an increase of misdemeanor

prosecutions to hold corporate executives responsible for violations made on their watch. 76 The
change in FDA stance was attributed to the perceived lack of investigation by the FDA in regards
to FD&C Act violations.77

FDA Commissioner Hamburg’s description of the increase of

misdemeanor prosecution under the doctrine as a “valuable enforcement tool”78 was a telling
indication to all in the pharmaceutical and medical device industry that the FDA planned to
resurrect a doctrine that had not been in use for decades to prosecute companies and those
responsible for FD&C Act infractions in addition to including a whole new set of potential
defendants.79

74

Id. at 2.

75

Glasner, supra note 53, at 2.

76

Letter from Margaret Hamburg, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., to Sen. Charles Grassley, at 2 (Mar. 4, 2010)

available at http://grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/FDA-3-4-10-Hamburg-letter-to-Grassley-re-GAO-report-onOci.pdf.
77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Glasner, supra note 53, at 3-4.
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To that end, the FDA released FDA “Manual 6-5-3: Recommending Park Doctrine”
which listed nonbinding criteria that the FDA will use to recommend criminal prosecutions
against a corporate officer in the pharmaceutical and medical device industry to be considered in
addition to the Supreme Court’s findings in Park and Dotterweich.80 These criteria include:

(1) Whether the violation involves actual or potential harm to the
public;
(2) Whether the violation is obvious;
(3) Whether the violation reflects a pattern of illegal behavior
and/or failure to heed prior warnings;
(4) Whether the violation is widespread;
(5) Whether the violation is serious;
(6) The quality of the legal and factual support for the proposed
prosecution; and
(7) Whether the proposed prosecution is a prudent use of agency
resources.81

The responsible corporate officer doctrine provides that an executive can be held liable
for a first time misdemeanor, and a felony violation for any additional conviction, under the
federal FD&C Act without proof that the corporate official acted with intent or even
negligence.82 Additionally, the corporate official did not have to have any actual knowledge of,
or participation in, the specific offense. 83

80

Knowledge of and actual participation in the violation

REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL § 6-5-3 – 2011, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 6-

5-3, available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/UCM074317.pdf (last
updated Sept. 16, 2011) [hereinafter REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL].
81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id.
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are not a prerequisite to a misdemeanor prosecution but are factors that may be relevant when
deciding whether to recommend charging a misdemeanor violation. 84

Moreover, responsibility

and control are central to the analysis of whether to bring a prosecution against an executive.
The troubling aspect of this Manual is just that: it is a non-binding guidance document
and not meant to hold more weight than the DOJ’s authority to prosecute. 85

The ultimate

decision to prosecute lies with the DOJ regardless of whether the evidence in a particular case
satisfies the aforementioned criteria.86
C. Relationship between FDA/DOJ/OIG
There are multiple arms of the government that theoretically should play a role in
investigations and prosecutions under the responsible corporate officer doctrine.
Criminal Investigations (hereinafter “OCI” is the FDA’s investigatory arm. 87

The Office of
All referrals for

potential criminal prosecution under the FD&C Act must first travel through the OCI. 88
However, the matter is not closed if the OCI decides against moving forward with potential
prosecution.89

84

Id.

85

Anne Walsh, FDA Finally Releases “Non-binding” Park Doctrine Criteria, FDA LAW BLOG (Feb. 6, 2011)

http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2011/02/fda-finally-releases-non-binding-park-doctrinecriteria.html.
86

Id. “The absence of some factors does not mean that a referral is inappropriate where other factors are evident.”

87

U.S. FOOD AND DRUG A DMINIST RATION: INSPECT IONS, COMPLIANCE , ENFORCEMENT , AND CRIMINAL

INVEST IGAT IONS, http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/criminalInvestigations/default.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
88

REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL §§ 6-5-1, 6-5-2.

89

Id. at §§ 6-5-1.
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There is an additional concern over prosecutions made by the DOJ under the responsible
corporate officer doctrine that the FDA does not participate in.

The False Claims Act allows

private citizens to file suit on behalf of the government in exchange for a percentage of the
monetary award.90 A suit filed by an individual on behalf of the government is known as a qui
tam action, and the private citizen who files the suit is called a relator.91 The DOJ can intervene
and proceed in the action already begun by attorneys outside of the government without any
specialized knowledge by FDA experts. 92
These governmental bodies use many penalties to punish those are convicted of a
violation of the FD&C Act and deter those who are tempted to commit a violation of the FD&C
Act. To further prevent corporate officers from committing a crime which would then violate the
responsible corporate officer doctrine, the government is using their power to block officers and
corporations from doing business in the area of federal health care programs. The FDA has the
power to debar93 and the OIG has the ability to exclude

94 both

individuals and corporations after

they are convicted under the responsible corporate officer doctrine through a violation of a
statute like the FD&C Act. For individuals, there is a presumption to exclude unless there are
“significant factors [that] weigh against exclusion”95 .

To this end, the OIG utilizes both

90

31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2014).

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

21 U.S.C. § 306; 21 U.S.C. § 335(a).

94

21 U.S.C. § 335(a).

95

Office of Inspector Gen., GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING PERMISSIVE EXCLUSION A UT HORITY UNDER SECT ION

1128(B)(15) OF T HE SOCIAL SECURITY A CT (Oct. 20, 2010), available at
https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/exclusions/files/permissive_ excl_under_1128b15_10192010.pdf.
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mandatory and permissible exclusions which are codified in the “Exclusion of certain individuals
and entities from participation in Medicare and State health care programs” statute. 96 The
mandatory and permissive exclusions are codified.97
Corporations who are reimbursed from federal health care programs these penalties
seriously because the OIG can block payment to any enterprise that is excluded or employs or
contracts with excluded individuals. 98

This is effectively a death sentence; no company or

corporate executive can continue to do business in the pharmaceutical and medical device realm
if they cannot sell prescription drugs within the government funded health care program realm. 99
Even if the corporate executive would like to try to get back within the industry while excluded,
every company checks the FDA debarment list and OIG exclusion list before hiring.

IV. SETTLEMENTS
The pharmaceutical and medical device industry are not willing go to trial under a
responsible corporate officer doctrine, evidenced by settling all prosecutions. They are scared of
the potentially high penalties faced with a guilty verdict after a long trial and uncertainty of what
could happen to both the corporation in question’s future and the executives themselves.
Additionally, the fact that there have been no significant trials in this area is troubling because

96

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2010).

97

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(1)-(4) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(1)-(16) (2010).

98

Ellis, supra note 30, at 979.

99

Id. at 994.
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the industry cannot look to the judiciary for guidance except for two dated cases and no trial
level case since the adoption of FDA Manual 6-5-3.
There are many questions can be raised: Would the responsible corporate officer doctrine
and how the government is prosecuting under it hold up in court today? What criteria of FDA
Manual 6-5-3 were at issue in each settlement? Were any criteria actually used by the FDA or
the DOJ? What was the FDA’s role in each settlement? There have been several prominent
settlements under the responsible corporate officer doctrine in the pharmaceutical and medical
device area and each one contributes to the discussion of where governmental agencies will be
focusing in their investigations and prosecution in this area moving forward.

A. Perdue Frederick
In 2007, the government brought an action against The Perdue Frederick Pharmaceutical
Company and the chief executive officer, general counsel, and chief medical officer individually
for criminal and civil violations of off-label promotion under the FD&C Act. 100 Specifically, the
government alleged that they stated misinformation in regards to safety profile of the drug
OxyContin.101

Rather than risk high punishments at trial, Perdue Frederick pleaded guilty to

felony misbranding charges for “failure to prevent Purdue’s fraudulent marketing of OxyContin”
and paid a fine of $600 million to settle. 102 Additionally, three executives of Purdue who were in
charge at the time of the violations pleaded guilty to misdemeanor misbranding, the OIG

100

Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

101

Id. at 816.

102

United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 569 (W.D. Va. 2007).
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excluded the executives from working for any corporation receiving federal funds, and they
agreed to enter into a five year corporate integrity agreement. 103
In 2009, the debarred executives sued the OIG and Health and Human Services (HHS)
arguing that the government cannot exclude/debar someone by virtue of a violation based on the
responsible corporate officer doctrine because of the lack of evidence and proof of personal
wrongdoing.104

As an alternative argument, the executives contended that the exclusion period

of twenty years was inappropriate when the length of exclusion authorized by statute is
considered which was “3 years, unless the Secretary determines in accordance with published
regulations that…a longer period is appropriate because of aggravating circumstances.”105

In

2010, the district court upheld the exclusion since the responsible corporate officer doctrine
applies and they were properly excluded by the OIG stating that “section 1320a–7(b)(1) appears
to permit the exclusion of anyone convicted of an offense ‘having a connection with or reference
to’ fraud or financial misconduct in the delivery of a health care item or service.”106
In 2012, the appellate court reversed and remanded the district court’s decision of the
length of exclusion.107

While the conviction for misdemeanor misbranding and the exclusion

decision by the OIG were sustained because the convictions were “factually related to fraud”, the
length of exclusion was technically authorized by statute and the court ordered HHS to provide

103

Friedman, 686 F.3d at 816.

104

Id. at 817.

105

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(1) and (3) was used by the OIG since this was a permissive exclusion.

106

Friedman v. Sebelius, 755 F.Supp.2d 98, 107–08 (D.D.C.2010) (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384, (1992)).
107

Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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justification that the facts of the case and the involvement of these specific individuals justified
that type of disbarment.108

In fact, an explanation for the length of exclusion and reconciliation

with prior exclusion decisions was not given by the Secretary.109 The OIG had not come close to
giving an exclusion period of this length before; the previous longest exclusion period had been
lower than ten years for a misdemeanor conviction. 110
However, the Friedman Court endorsed the district court’s reading of the responsible
corporate officer doctrine by ruling that the corporate executives had the “power and authority”
to prevent the fraudulent marketing but failed to so do which justifies debarment from the federal
healthcare system whether or not person had personal knowledge on which the charges were
levied.111 This finding was a resounding affirmation of the responsible corporate officer doctrine
in this context and the first time a Court of Appeals agreed. 112
While the underlying facts seem at first glance more analogous to the Park situation, the
underlying facts are more analogous to the Dotterweich case.

Like in Park, the company

committed acts that are dangerous to the public at large for several years and had ample means to
correct.

Instead of correcting those misdeeds, Purdue Frederick continued those misdeeds.

However, knowledge of the three executives was not found due to that fact was stipulated to in
the settlement.113 The DOJ did not have a warning letter or failed inspection to bolster their

108

Id. at 828.

109

Id. at 825.

110

Id. at 828.

111

Id. at 817.

112

Ellis, supra note 30, at 1013.

113

Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d at 571.

22

LAUTENBACH - IS IT WORTH SAVING? THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESPONSIBLE
CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE BEYOND PARK

argument like in the Park situation. In reference to the FDA Manual, it is clear that at least a
majority of the Manual’s criteria are satisfied with this situation: purposefully misbranding a
drug with a severe risk of addiction and abuse caused very serious114 harm to the public115 and
the training programs that educated sales representatives to employ these marketing techniques
were obvious,

116

widespread,

117

and a pattern of illegal behavior.

118 119

B. Synthes
In 2009, the government prosecuted Synthes executives outside of the commercial
management chain.120

The government alleged violations of the FD&C Act when Synthes

performed clinical trials of a bone filler medical device manufactured by its subsidiary Norian
without FDA approval.121

Both Synthes and Norian pleaded guilty to shipping adulterated and

misbranded medical devices in interstate commerce resulting in just over $23 million in criminal
and civil penalties while Synthes executives (the President of Synthes North America, President
of Synthes Spine Division, Vice President of Operations, and Director of Regulatory and Clinical
Affairs)122 pleaded guilty to misdemeanor misbranding under the responsible corporate officer

114

REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL §§ 6-5-3(5).

115

Id. at §§ 6-5-3(1).

116

Id. at §§ 6-5-3(2).

117

Id. at §§ 6-5-3(4).

118

Id. at §§ 6-5-3(3).

119

Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d at 571.

120

U.S. FOOD AND DRUG A DMINIST RATION, International Medical Device Maker Agrees to Plead Guilty in

Connection with Shipments of Adulterated and Misbranded Bone Cement Products , (October 4, 2010),
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm228273.ht m.
121

Id.

122

United States v. Huggins, No. 09-403-3, 201 WL 6180623, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2011).
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doctrine and sentenced to imprisonment of five to nine months. 123

In addition to imprisonment

and monetary penalties, Norian faced exclusion by the OIG.
The Synthes case is important because the facts are a departure from the traditional
responsible corporate officer doctrine prosecutions.

Not only did the executives know of the

underlying offenses, but they actively engaged to conceal relevant information and made false
statements to the FDA.124

That information led to a meaningful amount of jail time for Synthes

executives who had agreed to a FD&C Act misdemeanor conviction, the first time that has
happened within the pharmaceutical and medical device industry due to the “unprecedented
nature” of the Synthes executives’ actions. 125
The Synthes facts are in no way analogous to the Dotterweich case and would be closer
to the Park case. The executives had knowledge of the misdeeds from internal emails regarding
off-label use of the medical device not approved of by the FDA which led to patient injuries. 126
In addition, these same executives created and ran unauthorized clinical trials against FDA
policy.127

However, imprisonment for a misdemeanor a troubling aspect of this case is

imprisonment for a misdemeanor violation under the responsible corporate officer doctrine. The
sentencing judge posited that this case could be distinguished from Park.

Specifically, it was

noted that “[t]his case does not involve standard Park-doctrine behavior, in which an unaware

123

U.S. FOOD AND DRUG A DMINIST RATION, supra note 116.

124

Id.

125

Huggins, 2011 WL 6180623, at *2.

126

Id. at 3.

127

Id. at 5.
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corporate official is held strictly liable for the conduct of his subordinates.”128

This point raises

serious questions concerning the appropriateness of accepting a misdemeanor strict liability
responsible corporate officer doctrine plea deal due to the facts that penalties such as
imprisonment does an immense amount of damage to an executive’s reputation and millions of
dollars in fines are no longer relatively small. 129
C. KV Pharmaceuticals
In 2011, the Chief Executive Officer of KV Pharmaceuticals, Marc S. Hermelin, was
charged with misbranding drugs under the FD&C Act. 130

Over a two year period, Hermelin

ordered manufacturing increases of a range of generic drugs made in house. 131 Under Hermelin’s
leadership, the company did not take care in producing a quality product. 132 Specifically, the
management received both internal reports of irregularly shaped and oversized prescription drugs
through manufacturing controls and safety assessments as well as external reports from
customers who were given the product. 133
As part of accepting the settlement, Hermelin stated that the labeling on KV
Pharmaceuticals’ products were “false and misleading” because the specification of “uniform

128

Id. at 13.

129

See discussion of strict liability statute, supra pp. 12-13.

130

U.S. FOOD AND DRUG A DMINIST RATION, 2011 Marc S. Hermelin, Former CEO of KV Pharmaceutical, Pleads

Guilty to Misbranding Drugs and Agrees to Pay United States $1.9 Million as Fines and Forfeiture , (March 10,
2011), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm246881.ht m.
131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Id.
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strength” on the labels was incorrect due to the irregularities of their products. 134

Since the

products in question were shipped from St. Louis and discovered in California, the prescription
drugs crossed state lines where KV Pharmaceuticals introduced the drugs into interstate
commerce135 .

Hermlich was sentenced to a month of prison and penalties including a million

dollar fine, $900,000 in forfeiture fees136 , and exclusion from participation in federal healthcare
programs by the HHS OIG for 20 years. 137
Both KV and Hermelin’s actions satisfy many of the criteria in FDA Manual 6-5-3. The
pharmaceutical drug violations were obvious, 138 serious,139 and had the potential for harm to the
public.140

Be that as it may, like the executives in Synthes, Hermelin’s punishment after a

settlement for a strict liability crime is much larger than the punishments anticipated by the
majority in Dotterweich.
D. Forest Laboratories
Forest Laboratories pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor misbranding charge for marketing
an antidepressant drug before FDA approval and in spite of FDA warning letters.

141

The

corporation paid monetary penalties and forfeited assets totaling hundreds of millions of
134

Former Drug Company Executive Pleads Guilty in Oversized Drug Tablets Case , U.S. DEPART MENT OF JUST ICE

(March 10, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-drug-company-executive-pleads-guilty-oversized-drugtablets-case.
135

Id.

136

U.S. FOOD AND DRUG A DMINIST RATION, supra note 131.

137

Glasner, supra note 53, at 3.

138

REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL §§ 6-5-3.
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Id.

140

Id.
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Glasner, supra note 53, at 3.
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dollars.142

The OIG decided to pursue exclusion for the chairman of Forest Laboratories,

Howard Solomon.143

However, this situation was unique because Solomon was never convicted

in his individual capacity in the Forest Laboratories settlement, marking this as the first time the
OIG was seeking to exclude a corporate executive solely due to their position within a company
that accepted a settlement offer.144

While the OIG eventually decided against exclusion in light

of evidence submitted on behalf of Solomon, the Forest Laboratories matter is troubling because
the OIG sought to exclude Solomon with no criminal charges linking Solomon individually to
the underlying offense.145
E. Synthesis of Settlements/Conclusion
FIGURE 2: Synthesis of Settlements
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These settlements serve as an example of a current trend that should concern those who
may be at the center of a future prosecution under the responsible corporate officer doctrine.
Governmental arms are overreaching and misusing the responsible corporate officer doctrine in
two ways. First, penalties for strict liability public welfare offenses were not intended to result in
the penalties ordered by courts today (Purdue Frederick and Synthes). Additionally, they are
punishing those who have not been convicted on an individual basis (Forest Laboratories). A
conviction should be the basis on which the government penalizes a corporate wrongdoer, and
the penalties should be appropriate with the spirit of the statute.
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V. DEVELOPMENT/RECOMMENDATIONS
It is increasingly becoming difficult for companies to determine and difficulty in what
kind of certainty and provisions to tell clients in the industry facing an investigation or
prosecution under the responsible corporate officer doctrine.

Observers are doubtful of the

legality of the responsible corporate officer doctrine for the reasons set forth above and would
support a challenge.146

From a policy perspective, if the uncertainty of punishments given in the

past as well as uncertainty over where settlement punishments are going in the future deters even
one skilled, quality candidate that could make a difference in the company they choose to serve
for the patients they choose to serve from taking a corporate executive job because of the
aforementioned uncertainty, the cost of uncertainty may be too high. 147

The glowing

endorsement given by Commissioner Hamburg suggests that the FDA will not stop using such a
powerful tool and corporate executives need to pay close attention to any moves the FDA would
make in this area.148
The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine is warranted to keep corporate executives in
check. Any deterrent factor the doctrine has is a positive for the industry and society. 149
However, one commented posited that the government should prosecute executives independent
of participation in the underlying offense. 150

Additionally, she offered the view that executives

146

Glasner, supra note 53, at 3.

147

Id. at 6-7.

148

REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL §§ 6-5-3.

149

Sepinwall, supra note 31, at 376.

150

Id. at 378.
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should be punished solely on the grounds of their position. 151 This approach seems too harsh and
for the reasons set forth, should not be the effect of this doctrine.

A. Ability of judicial review?
The responsible corporate officer doctrine was borne from Supreme Court statutory
interpretation.152

Nonetheless, safeguards that were placed in effect by the Supreme Court are

not being used by the FDA and DOJ. For example, Justice Burger in Park suggested that
recommending the class of executives responsible in a certain situation should be dependent on
evidence produced to the jury in a trial. 153

Justice Burger’s sentiment is not being followed

today because there has not been one violation of the FD&C Act in the pharmaceutical and
medical device industry has gone to trial after FDA Commissioner Hamburg revived the
responsible corporate officer doctrine. Since there is a disparity between the uncertain utilization
of the doctrine by the FDA and the DOJ, is there a way for the responsible corporate officer
doctrine to be revised from the high court?
This remedy is not likely to occur right away. Although the Supreme Court can take this
issue with the right case, there are several reasons why this recommendation may not be
immediately possible. First, executives must be willing to risk steep penalties both professionally
(debarment or exclusion) and/or personally (imprisonment). Additionally, the corporation must
be willing to roll the dice and risk large fines and/or the ability to continue doing business in the

151

Id. at 380.

152

See discussion of case law, supra pp. 4-10.

153

Park, 421 U.S. at 669.
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government funded pharmaceutical and medical device realm. While the ability of judicial
review is possible, it is not probable in the near future.

B. Narrowing the Doctrine through the legislature?
Government agencies are looking to utilize the responsible corporate officer doctrine as a
basis for criminal prosecutions. At the very least, the FDA should revise their manual to make a
more stream-lined approach to investigating and recommending prosecution to the DOJ.

The

most egregious FD&C Act violations are the ones where the corporate officer responsible for the
company has knowledge of the underlying offenses but fails to take action to remedy the
situation.154

These circumstances fit squarely within the spirit of past Supreme Court decisions

(Park and Dotterweich) together with the criteria of FDA Manual 6-5-3; therefore, these
situations do not raise serious concerns of prosecution of FD&C Act violations under the
responsible corporate officer doctrine.
However, there are questions of whether these prosecutions have a deterrent factor for
those executives who have no knowledge of the underlying offense because that seems
counterintuitive: an executive cannot be deterred from committing an offense if they do not
know of an offense being committed. If the FDA revised their manual to recommend prosecution
against those who received warning letters and failed to take corrective action, more within the
government who act in this area as well as corporate executives would have a better idea of what
kinds of acts can fall within the responsible corporate officer doctrine.

154

Glasner, supra note 53, at 5.
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C. Tandem Prosecution
The specific concern lies with the fact that when a qui tam155 action in this area proceeds
without the help or specialized knowledge of FDA experts, it circumvents the intended use of the
responsible corporate officer doctrine by the Supreme Court. 156 As such, there should be judicial
concern if the FDA is not involved. If the FDA recommends that an investigation should
conclude should the DOJ not pursue prosecution? The possibility of a collaborative agreement
between the FDA and DOJ would likely alleviate these concerns. If a collaborative agreement is
possible, the DOJ can still use their power of choosing which qui tam cases to intervene in and
prosecute with the FDA’s specialized knowledge. If a collaborative agreement is not possible, a
recommendation for the DOJ to enact guidelines similar to FDA Manual 6-5-3 would be a step in
the right direction.157

D. Industry Action to Safeguard Itself from Possible Prosecution
The responsible corporate officer doctrine, through Park and Dotterweich, was conceived
before companies throughout the industry constructed their own complex compliance programs.
However, starting and maintaining a comprehensive compliance programs may be the only
realistic real-time option executives in this area have because relying on the Supreme Court to
decide could take ten to fifteen years if at all. This estimate is premised on the realization that a

155

See discussion of the FDA’s relationship with the DOJ in reference to qui tam actions, supra p. 18.

156

U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, supra note 73, at 8.

157

The concerns of FDA Manual 6-5-3, discussed supra, would carry over to any guidelines the DOJ enacts.
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corporation may not turn down a settlement offer because of the severe penalties one would face
if they proceed to trial and assumption that the Supreme Court or a Court of Appeals may not
grant certiorari to hear the case. Additionally, executives should not rely on the Legislature or
pass new laws or amend existing laws to make this doctrine more clear (although submitting a
citizen’s petition could be faster if executives ask the government to work with industry
professionals).
Industry should be aware of FDA or DOJ triggers that can alert an executive that an FDA
investigation or a DOJ prosecution is near.

It is uncertain whether the FDA Manual 6-5-3

criteria are used to determine which investigations to refer to the DOJ or whether the DOJ takes
the criteria into account when determining which cases to prosecute and/or settle.

All specific

FDA feedback on any potential violations through a warning letter or a failed inspection should
be reviewed with extreme caution. Industry officers would do well to work with the FDA at this
stage to prevent a prosecution recommendation to the DOJ. Additionally, industry executives
should monitor all available corporate integrity agreements to see where the DOJ has paid
particular attention to within other companies.
Since the responsible corporate officer doctrine was formed from public policy aspects of
ensuring the safety of the public at large as well as the efficacy of the federal health care
programs, industry should take an introspective look at their companies and their corporate
officers to determine specific offices or departments that lack oversight.

VI. CONCLUSION
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While the responsible corporate office doctrine goes further than it should in regards to
the principle tenets of criminal law, the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine is a necessary
tool for the government to punish wrongdoers and deter others who are tempted to commit the
same illegal conduct.

The policy reasons of keeping corporate officers in check to ensure the

safety the public at large is extremely important. However, those facing prosecution under the
responsible corporate officer doctrine cannot fully contemplate punishments under the doctrine
due to the misuse of the doctrine by government agencies that rely on dated cases that stand on
shaky constitutional grounds.

With that in mind, I propose that the question of whether the

responsible corporate officer doctrine should be abolished is misplaced and instead invite the
question of what can be done to retool what could be a useful device for all to comply with laws
and requirements within managerial ranks of a pharmaceutical or medical device corporation.
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